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Article 8

Utah's School Trust Lands:
A Century of Unrealized Expectations
I.

INTRODUCTION

Upon admission to the Union, the state of Utah received a substantial amount of land in trust from the federal government for the
support of its schools. 1 Unfortunately, Utah's "school trust lands," as
they are called, have failed to produce appreciable revenue, and the
state's schools have been deprived of much-needed funding as a result.
Many factors have contributed to the failure of the trust lands to produce revenue, but none have been as significant as the federal government's refusal to cooperate with Utah's efforts to consolidate its school
trust lands into large blocks which the state could effectively manage.
Two departments of the Utah state government have recently initiated or threatened to initiate unprecedented actions in attempts to force
the federal government to cooperate with the state in effecting land exchanges, thereby enabling Utah to realize revenue from its trust lands.
In July 1989, the Utah Board of State Lands and Forestry (the State
Land Board) vented its frustrations with the federal government by
proposing the sale of 116,000 acres of Utah school trust lands trapped
within national parks and Indian reservations. About three months
later, James Moss, in his role as State Superintendent of Public Education, publicly asked Utah's attorney general to sue the federal government for inverse condemnation of some of Utah's trust lands.
This comment discusses some of the reasons for the failure of
Utah's school trust lands to provide the state's public schools with appreciable revenues. The comment opens with a description of the history of Utah's school trust lands, the obligations associated with school
trust lands in general and the congressional intent behind the grant of
school trust lands. The comment next shows how federal inaction on
exchange proposals and in-lieu selections has prevented Utah from fulfilling its trustee obligations by preventing the state from recognizing
1. Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138 §§ 6, 10, 28 Stat. 107 (1894). The origin~! land gr~nt totaled
nearly 7.5 million acres. Pusuc LAND LAw REVIEW CoMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE :\AnoN's LAND 244 (1970).
Although the state has disposed of some of this land, Utah continues to own over 3. 7 million
acres of trust lands. In addition, the state retains mineral rights in nearly 1 million acres of trust
lands where the surface rights have been sold. Sff Utah Department of Natural Resources, Division of State Lands and Forestry, State Land Ownership by County and Grant (June 30, 1989)
(unpublished report on file with the BYU Journal of Public Law).
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revenue from its school trust lands. The comment then examines the
State Land Board's Draft General Management Plan (GMP), 2 which
proposed the sale or lease of trust lands trapped within national parks
and Indian reservations, and Superintendent Moss's request for the
state to sue the federal government. The comment concludes by examining the possibility and likelihood of success of a Utah action charging
the federal government with inverse condemnation of Utah's school
trust lands.

II.
A.

HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS

The Land Ordinance of 1785

Congress laid the foundation for our current public land system
when it passed the Land Ordinance of 1785. 3 The rectangular survey
system adopted by Congress on that date remains in use today, although it was the subject of considerable debate before it was passed.
In 1784, a committee which included Thomas Jefferson proposed
a plan of government of the Northwest Territory and for the sale of
western lands. 4 This plan advocated surveying lands using a geographical "mile" of 6,086 feet, thereby allowing the creation of units ten
"miles" square, divided into 100 sections of 850 acres or one square
"mile" each.~ Under the plan, individuals interested in purchasing land
were required to purchase land warrants, which they would then surrender to a district surveyor after selecting the particular lands they
desired. 6 The surveyor, after ascertaining that no previous locations had
been made on that particular tract, would then issue a patent. 7
By contrast, the rectangular system of land surveys actually
adopted in the Land Ordinance of 1785 provides for the division of
territories ceded by individual states to the United States into townships
2. DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND FoRESTRY, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, DRAFT G~:NERAL. MANAGEMENT PLAN: MARKETJN(; OF UTAH TRUST LANDS INHELD
WITHIN NATIONAL PARK SERVICE SYSTEM UNITS AND INDIAN RESERVATIONS (1989) [hereinafter GMP] (copy on file with the BYU Journal of Public Law).
3. 1-!. CoMMAl;ER, DoCU~IENTS OF AMERICAN IIISTORY 123 (9th ed. 1973)
4. P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 61, 63 (1968).
5. !d.
6. ill at 61.
7. /d. It is interesting to note that Jefferson, a Virginian, advocated the idea of surveying
lands before selling them, an idea adopted from New England. !d. at 61-62. Virginia's lands, by
wntrast, had been settled by indiscriminate location of claims with subsequent surveys hy metes
and bounds, a practice that led to extensive litigation concernim; conf1icting claims. /rl. at 61-63.
Although no official record of the congressional debate regarding the Land Ordinance of 1785
exists, the conf1ict between proponents of the Virginia and New England procedures was apparently spirited (William Grayson, a delegate from Virginia, said that debates over the respective
merits of the two proposals would fill 40 volumes). !d. at 64.
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measuring six miles by six miles. 8 Each township is divided into thirtysix numbered sections, each containing 640 acres or one square mile. In
addition to establishing a method for surveying new lands, the Ordinance of 1785 reflects the importance Congress placed on public education by providing that section sixteen of every township should be reserved for the maintenance and support of public schools. 9
The federal government continued to grant section sixteen of every
township to states entering the Union until 1848, when Oregon became
a state and was granted both section sixteen and section thirty-six from
each township for the support of its schools. 10 This practice continued
until 1894, when Utah was admitted as a state and was granted four
sections from each township for the support of its schools. 11 Arizona
and New Mexico each received similar grants of four sections from
each township. 12

B.

Creation of Inholdings

Utah's trust lands, as well as those of other states, consist of the
same numbered sections in each township. Although the state has sold
some trust lands and has participated in small land exchanges with the
federal government involving trust lands, most of the state's trust land
still consists of one-square-mile parcels of land scattered randomly
throughout the state. In the years since Utah obtained statehood in
1896, the federal government has created Indian reservations, national
parks, and other National Park System (NPS) units throughout the
state. Generally, the lands that the federal government has designated
as Indian reservations and NPS units have included existing trust
lands. As a result, over 116,000 acres of Utah's school trust lands are
trapped within NPS units and Indian reservations 13 as shown below:
Arches National Park
Capital Reef National Park
Dinosaur National Monument
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area
Goshute Indian Reservation
Navajo Indian Reservation

7,222
20,234
3,057
51,297
1,120
33,561

Acres
Acres
Acres
Acres
Acres
Acres

8. CoMMAGER, sufua note 3, at 123.
9. !d.
10. Oregon Enabling Act, ch. 177 § 20, 9 Stat. 323 (1848). Srr also McCormack, Land Uu
Planning and Managnnmt of Stair School Lands, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 525.
11. Utah Enabling Act, supra note 1, at § 6.
12. Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Act, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 561, 572 (1910).
13. GMP, supra note 2, at 1, 4.
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These trapped lands are referred to as inholdings.

C.

The Conflicting Purposes of National Parks, RPsen,ations, and
Trust Lands

The purposes of national parks, Indian reservations, and school
trust lands are congressionally mandated. However, these purposes directly conflict with each other. National parks exist "to conserve the
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein
and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations." 14 Indian reservations are generally held in trust by the
United States government for Indian tribes. 111 As the following discussion of the trust obligation associated with school trust lands shows, the
school trust lands are intended to provide a financial base with which
to support education in the state of Utah. States are required to obtain
the maximum possible economic return from their trust lands, but they
simply cannot do this while preserving the same lands for the
unimpaired enjoyment of future generations. 16

III.
A..

TRUST OBLIGATIONS

ThP Utah Enabling A.ct

An analysis of any state's obligations toward its school trust lands
must begin with the instrument granting the lands to the state. Section
6 of the Utah Enabling Act contains Utah's actual land grant, which
grants sections 2, 16, 32, and 36 in every township of the state to Utah
upon admission of the state into the Union "for the support of common
schools." 17 Section 10 of the act sets forth Utah's trust obligations regarding the lands:
[T]he proceeds of lands herein granted for educational purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, shall constitute a permanent
school fund, the interest of which only shall be expended for the support of said schools, and such land shall not be subject to pre-emption,
homestead entry, or any other entry under the land laws of the
united States, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed
14. 16 C.S.C § 1 (1988).
15. For background on Indian property law, see F. Com:N, HANDBOOK oF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW Ch. 9 ( 1982).
16. Although some persuasive arguments have been made for managing school trust lands
through a multiple-use sustained yield policy instead of the current policy of maximum economic
return, these arguments have yet to find favor with the courts. Srr, r.r;., McCormack, supra note
10.

17. Utah Enabling Art, sufJra note 1, § 6.
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for school purposes only. 18
Utah accepted its land grants m the Utah Constitution, which
provides:
All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter be granted to

the State by Congress, and all lands acquired by gift, grant or devise
. . . are hereby accepted, and declared to be the public lands of the
State; and shall be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of as
may be provided by law, for the respective purposes for which they
have been or may be granted, donated, devised or otherwise
acquired. 19
The Utah Constitution also provides that the state guarantees all public
school funds against loss or diversion. 20
In Andrus v. Utah, 21 the United States Supreme Court characterized the school land grant as a "solemn agreement" between Utah and
the federal government. 22 As the Court explained, "The United States
agreed to cede some of its land to the State in exchange for a commitment by the State to use the revenues derived from the land to educate
the citizenry." 23

B.

Cas!' Law DPfining thl' Trust Obligation

There is a substantial body of case law dealing with the principles
governing management of state school trust lands. As the following discussion shows, the overwhelming majority of this case law holds that
states, as trustees of school trust lands, are required to obtain the maximum possible economic return from their trust lands for their public
schools, which are the trust beneficiaries.
Judicial comment on the various states' trust obligations regarding
school trust lands dates back at least to 1852, when the United States
Supreme Court declared that funds derived from school trust lands
could only be used to benefit the common schools. 24 In 1919, the Supreme Court discussed the trust obligation at length in Er1'im z•.
Unitl'd Statl's. 25 In Ervien, the New Mexico Commissioner of Public
Lands sought to spend up to three percent of the income generated by
New Mexico's trust lands to advertise the resources of the state. The
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

!d. at § 10.
l'TAH CoNST. art. XX, § 1.

!d. at art. X, § 7.
446 US. 500 (1980).

!d. at 507.
!d.
Board of Trustees for the Vincennes Univ. v. Indiana, 55 lJ S. 268, 274 (I R52).
251 U.S. 41 (1919).
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Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Act provides that lands granted by the
act
[s]hall be by the said State held in trust, to be disposed of in whole or
in part only in manner as herein provided . . . disposition of any of
said lands, or of any money or thing of value directly or indirectly
derived therefrom, for any object other than that for which such particular lands, or the lands from which such money or thing of value
shall have been derived, were granted or confirmed, or in any manner
contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a breach of
trust. 26
The Supreme Court held that the New Mexico Commissioner of
Public Lands had no authority to use trust money to promote the virtues of his state, even though such advertising might well increase the
value of the remaining trust lands and therefore benefit the trust beneficiaries. As the Court explained, "There is in the Enabling Act a specific enumeration of the purposes for which the lands were granted and
the enumeration is necessarily exclusive of any other purpose." 27 The
Court went on to explicitly state that the United States, as grantor of
the trust lands, had the power to impose restrictions on the use of the
lands and to exact performance of the conditions it attached to the land
grant. 28
One of the most frequently cited cases dealing with school trust
lands is Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway Departmenl. 29
Lassen originated as a controversy between the Arizona State Highway
Department and the Arizona State Land Commissioner. The Highway
Department attempted to obtain rights of way to build a highway over
school trust lands. The Highway Department argued that because
highways constructed across school trust lands would enhance the value
of remaining trust lands in amounts equal to or greater than the value
of the lands taken, it should not be required to compensate the Land
Commissioner for the lands it took. The Arizona Supreme Court
agreed and ordered the Land Commissioner to grant the Highway Department rights of way across school trust lands without compensation.
The Supreme Court reversed the Arizona ruling, requiring the
Highway Department to pay to the Land Commissioner the land's appraised value. The Court held, "The Enabling Act unequivocally demands . . . that the trust receive the full value of any lands transferred
26. lrl. at 45 (quoting Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Act § 10).
27. Irl. at 47.
28. Irl. at 48.
29. 385 U.S. 458 (1967)
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from it." 30 In reaching this decision, the Court reviewed the legislative
history of the Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Act:
The restrictions placed upon land grants to the States became steadily
more rigid and specific in the 50 years prior to [the Enabling] Act, as
Congress sought to require prudent management and thereby to preserve the usefulness of the grants for their intended purposes. The
Senate Committee on the Territories, with the assistance of the Department of Justice, adopted for the New Mexico-Arizona Act the
most satisfactory of the restrictions contained in the earlier grants. Its
premise was that the grants cannot 'be too carefully safeguarded for
the purpose for which they are appropriated.' [One senator] described
the restrictions as 'quite the most important item' in the Enabling
Act, and emphasized that his committee believed that 'we were giving
the lands to the States for specific purposes, and that restrictions
should be thrown about it which would assure its being used for those
purposes.' 31
Because the Court intended its decision to apply to school trust
land problems generally, Lassrn has been repeatedly cited by both state
and federal courts attempting to determine the extent of trust obligations associated with school trust lands. 32
In Oklahoma Education Association, Inc. v. Nigh, 33 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that state statutes which provided
for the use of school trust land assets and funds to subsidize farming
and ranching operations in the state were unconstitutional. In so holding, the court stated that Oklahoma's acceptance of its trust lands created an "irrevocable compact between the United States and Oklahoma,
for the benefit of the common schools, which cannot be altered or abrogated. " 34 In discussing the trust obligation, the court stated:
The State has an irrevocable duty, as Trustee, to manage the trust
estate for the exclusive benefit of the beneficiaries, and return full
value from the use and disposition of the trust property . . . . No Act
of the Legislature can validly alter, modify or diminish the State's
duty as Trustee of the school land trust to administer it in a manner
most beneficial to the trust estate and in a manner which obtains the
maximum benefit in return from the use of trust property or loan of

30. !d. at 466 (quoting Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Art § 10).
31. !d. at 467-68 (footnotes omitted).
32. The Court stated that it heard the case "because of the importance of the issues presented
both to the United States and to the States which have received [school trust] lands." !d. at 461.
La.\.\f/1 generated considerable interest among states holding trust lands; nine states submitted alllirU.\ curiar briefs to the Court. !d. at 461 n.5.
33. 642 P.2d 230 (Okla. 1982).
34. !d. at 235.
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In State ex rel. Ebke v. Board of Education Lands and Funds, 36
the Nebraska Supreme Court analyzed statutes which provided that
lessees of school trust lands could renew their leases at rates below fair
market value. The court found the statutes unconstitutional. Although
some parties involved in the case contended that providing maximum
return to the trust was only one of several factors that the court should
consider, the court expressly disagreed, pointing out that "the primary
purpose of the trust is the production of income for the support and
maintenance of the common schools of the state." 37
In Kanaly v. State, 38 the South Dakota Supreme Court analyzed a
statute which closed the University of South Dakota at Springfield,
changed the university into a minimum-security prison and transferred
control of the prison/university from the Board of Regents to the Board
of Charities and Corrections without consideration. The court ruled
that in light of the South Dakota Enabling Act, which created a "special, permanent and perpetual trust" for the educational institutions of
the state, the trust lands upon which the university was situated could
not be transferred to other state agencies for anything less than full
value. 39 After describing the nature of the trust, the court stated, "The
beneficiaries of this trust, compact, and contract created and established
by the Enabling Act and the South Dakota Constitution are the various
educational institutions of this state. The beneficiaries do not include
the general public, other governmental institutions, nor the general
welfare of this state. " 40
The Arizona Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its intent to adhere to the policy of obtaining maximum economic benefit from its
school trust lands in Deer Valley Unified School District No. 9 7 <'.
Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa. 41 In Deer Valle)', a school
district sought to obtain a fifteen-acre parcel of school trust land upon
which the district wished to construct a new school. The school district
attempted to condemn the site (which would have required the district
to pay the appraised value of the land) and offered in the alternative to
bid on the land at a public auction. The Arizona State Land Department refused to cooperate with any of the district's attempts to obtain
35.
3C,.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Jrl. at 235-36.
154 Neb. 244, 47 N.W.2d 520 (1951).
/d. at 247, 47 N.W.2d at 523.
368 N.W.2d 819 (S.D. 1985)

lrl at 823-24.
!d. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
157 Ariz. 537, 760 P.2d 537 (1988).
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the property, preferring to hold the property for future leases in an
attempt to maximize the property's contribution to the school trust. A
trial court dismissed the school district's action seeking to condemn the
property, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. The court found
that the Arizona Constitution forbade condemnation as a means of disposal of school trust lands and required that disposal take place at a
public auction. 42 Thus, Derr Valley holds that a state land board has
authority to retain trust lands in hopes for future earnings, even if by
retaining the lands the land board deprives school districts of land
needed for new schools.
The above summary of cases represents only a small fraction of
the cases discussing the trust obligation attached to school trust lands. 43
However, the cases cited above clearly define the trust obligation, and
there is no indication that courts will depart from their interpretation
of the trust obligation in the future. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its long-standing "concern for the integrity of the conditions imposed by the [enabling acts]," stating that such concern "has long been
evident. " 44
In addition to the case law summarized above, the Utah Attorney
General's office has analyzed Utah's obligations regarding its school
trust lands. In one instance, the Utah State Land Board approved the
sale of school trust lands to two counties. The Land Board sold the
lands for their appraised value, but then discounted the sale price by
fifty percent because the state retained a reversionary interest in the
lands. In an informal opinion, the Attorney General's office opined that
a sale for anything less than fair market value of the lands was
unconstitutional:
[T]he land grant trust demands fair market value for any disposition
of any interest in state trust lands, whether by the legislature or the
Board . . . . [T]he Board policy of discounting sales of determinable

42. !d. at 541, 760 P.2d at 541.
43. For further rase law regarding school trust obligations, see llnited States v. 111.2 Acres
of Land, 298 F Supp. 1042 (E.D. Wash. 1968), nffd., 435 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1970) iWashmgton statute donating school trust land to the United States held unconstitutional because the Washington Enabling Act requires that school trust lands not be disposed of unless the full fair market
value of the estate or interest disposed of is paid to the state); County of Skamania v. State, 102
Wash. 2d 127, 685 P.2d 576 (1984) (Washington statute allowing holders of timber leases on
school trust lands to base their lease terms on the timber market hrld unconstitutional because it
would benefit timber industry at the expense of trust beneficiaries); State v. llniversity of Alaska,
624 P.2d 807 (Alaska 1981) (holding that Alaska could not include 5,040 arTes of university trust
lands in a state park because restricting land uses would not allow the trustees to maximize the
economic return from the land for the benefit of the university)
44. Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 109 S. Ct. 2037, 2053 (1989) (quoting Alamo Land & Cattle Co.
v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 302 (1976)).
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fees by 50o/o to account for the state's retained reversionary interest is
an improper exercise of the Board's authority and inconsistent with
their trust duties. ~
4

The above discussion shows that states have a congressionallymandated duty to obtain the maximum economic return from school
trust lands, that any use of trust lands which does not directly benefit
the beneficiaries of the trust is a violation of a state's duties under the
trust, and that states may not dispose of any interest in school trust
lands for anything less than the full fair market value of that interest. 46

C.

lntfnt BPhind the Land Grant

In Lassen v. Arizona, 47 the Supreme Court explained that the intent of the land grant was to provide states with a fund with which to
support their schools:
Thr grant was plainly rxprctrd to produce a fund, accumulatrd by
salr and usr of the trust lands, with which the State could support
the public institutions designated by the Act. It was not supposed that
Arizona would retain all the lands given it for actual use by the beneficiaries; the lands were obviously too extensive and too often inappropriate for the selected purposes. Congress could scarcely have expected, for example, that many of the 8,000,000 acres of its grant 'for
the support of the common schools,' all chosen without regard to topography or school needs, would be employed as building sites. It
intended instead that Arizona would use the general powers of sale
and lease given it by the Act to accumulate funds with which it could
support its schools! 8

Other sources agree that Congress probably assumed that the states
would either sell their school trust lands outright or that the states
would use the proceeds of the sale of trust lands to acquire other lands
in contiguous units which would be more likely to produce revenue_4 9
This conclusion is consistent with the language of the Utah Enabling
45. Informal Op. Utah Att'y Gen. No. 85-62 (Oct. 7, 1985).
46. Sn· Department of State Lands v. Pettibone, 216 Mont. 361, 702 P 2d 948 (1985) (holding that an appurtenant water right on school trust land constitutes an interest in land, and therefore cannot be surrendered by the state for anything less than its fair market value).
47. 385 U.S. 458 (1967).
48. Jrl at 463 (emphasis added). Although this excerpt mentions Arizona specifically, the
Court intended its La"fll decision to apply to all states holding school trust lands lands. It is
therefore appropriate to apply this passage to Utah as well. Srr sujna note 32 and accompanying
text.
49. Srr, r.g., McCormack, supra note 10, at 535, 536; UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND ENERGY, PROJECT BOLD: PROPOSAL FOR UTAH LAND CoNSOLIDATION AND
ExcHANGt: 3 ( 1985) [hereinafter PROJECT BOLD PROPOSAL].
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Act itself, which stipulates that "the proceeds of lands . . granted for
educational purposes
shall constitute a permanent school fund." 60
IV.

FEDERAL INACTION

Unfortunately, the trust fund established by the Utah Enabling
Act has never been a source of great revenue to its beneficiaries. 51 The
chief factor which prevents Utah from realizing appreciable income
from its trust lands is the fact that most of the state's trust lands remain
in the same pattern of scattered one-square-mile sections in which the
state received them.
For some time, the state has attempted to effect land exchanges,
both on small and large scales, in order to consolidate its landholdings
and thereby enable the state to manage its trust lands effectively. However, these exchange proposals have been consistently delayed and/or
rejected by the federal government, both through simple inaction and
through a cumbersome exchange process which makes even the simplest
exchanges extremely difficult and time-consuming.
It is easy to understand the reluctance of various federal agencies
to make land exchanges with the state a high priority. Most of Utah's
square-mile sections of school lands are surrounded by land which the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) controls. The trust lands, therefore, are generally controlled by the BLM as well; if the federal government actually engaged in a large-scale land exchange with the state
of Utah, the BLM would lose effective control of about four million
acres. Most of the trust lands that are not surrounded by BLM lands
are trapped within national parks; the NPS effectively controls these
lands.~ 2

Utah's experience in obtaining its "in-lieu" selections provides a
good example of federal unwillingness to cooperate with the state on
matters involving land exchanges. The Utah Enabling Act provides that
50. Utah Enabling Act, sujJra note 1, at § 10 (emphasis added).
51. Utah has sold, given away, or otherwise disposed of between three and four million acres
of trust lands. However, as of June 30, 1989, there was only about $37,000,000.00 in the school
trust fund. Sn Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, Annual Fiscal Report (June 30, 1989)
(unaudited and unpublished) (copy on file with the BYU Journal of Public Law); Utah Division
of State Lands and Forestry, Statement of Fund Balance (June 30, 1989) (unpublished and on file
with the BYU Journal of Public Law). The interest derived from this fund provides little support
for Utah's public schools. Education expenses now constitute nearly 50% of Utah\ state budget.
f ... g., Deseret News, Aug. 6, 1989, at B2, col. 1. The income from the school trust lands currently
provides only about one percent of that amount. Srr Testimony Prepared for Former Utah Governor Scott M. Matheson Before the House Subcommittee on Public Lands Concerning H.R. 4005,
the Utah-Federal Exchange Act of 1988, at 4 (May 20, 1988) (unpublished and on file with the
BYU Journal of Public Law) [hereinafter Matheson Testimony].
52. Srr sujJra note 13 and accompanying text.
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if any of the sections granted to the state in the Enabling Act had already been disposed of by Congress, the state would be entitled to
"other lands equivalent thereto."~ 3 These lands have since become
known as "in-lieu" lands, because they are selected by the state in lieu
of trust lands to which the state was entitled. Utah was not surveyed
until long after its admission to the Union, and therefore did not file
the first of its indemnity selection lists with the BLM until 1965. 54
However, the state did not complete its in-lieu selections until after
1985. ~~
Furthermore, in 197 4, the Secretary of the Interior imposed a new
standard on in-lieu selections after the state had submitted its selections. Traditionally, land exchanges had been conducted on an acre-foracre basis; the standard imposed in 1974 called for exchanges to be
prohibited if they involved "grossly disparate values." 66 Utah challenged the new standard in court, and the Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, upheld the new standard.~ 7
Frustration with the scattered pattern of state school trust lands
gave rise in early 1981 to Utah's Project BOLD, a proposal for land
exchange which would have consolidated Utah's school trust lands into
forty-seven large blocks through congressional, rather than administrative, action.~ 8 The Project BOLD proposal cites federal inaction on exchange proposals as one of the factors preventing the state from exercising its trust responsibilities:
The checkerboard pattern of State school lands often leads to conflict
between the State and federal governments over use of specific lands
and often precludes the State from exercising its school trust responsibilities. Attempts to address these problems through small exchanges
of State parcels with the federal government have been frustrating
and largely unsuccessful. Somp PxchangP proposals hmlf bern pend-

ing more than 20

ymrs.~ 9

53. Utah Enabling Act, .111jna note 1, at § 6.
54. Andrus v. l'tah, 446 LS. 500, 503-04 (1980).

'i'i. Matheson & Becker, !lnjnm•ing Publir Land Mrmagnnmt Through Land J<;xrhangr:

Opportuuitir, aud Pitfall, of thr L'tah Exprrintrr, 33 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 4.03[1]
(1988).
56. !d. at § 4.03[ I);

11'1'

alw Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 503-06.

57 Andrus v. Ctah. 446 U.S. 500 (1980). In his dissent, Justice Powell noted that the
Court's opinion "ignores the clear meaning of statutes spanning about two centuries in which
Congress specifically adopted an equal acreage principle as the standard for making compensation" for in-iieu selections /rl. at 521 (Powell, J, dissenting).
58. Srr [!;fllt'rrtl/y UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY, PROJECT
BOLD: ALTERNATIVES FOR UTAH LAND CONSOLIDATION AND EXCHANGE ( 1982); PROJECT
BOLD PROPO~AL, sujmt note 49; and Matheson & Becker, sujJra note 55.
59. PROJECT BOLD PROPOSAL, supra note 49, at 4 (emphasis added).
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Former Utah Governor Scott Matheson recently co-authored an
article describing Utah's experiences with land exchanges during his
tenure as governor. In his description of the difficulties of the administrative exchange process, Governor Matheson points out that "[i]n 1984
Utah had more than 22 exchange applications pending with the Bureau of Land Management covering over 200,000 acres of land dating
back to June, 1967 . . . . [T]he complexities of the exchange process
rendered all but the simplest and smallest exchanges impossible to
complete. " 60

V.

THE PRoPosAL To SELL UTAH's INHOLDINGS

The inability of the state to consolidate its trust lands, thereby allowing the state to effectively manage those lands, has led to increasing
frustration on the part of state officials. These frustrations reached the
boiling point on April 11, 1989, when the Utah State Land Board
adopted a resolution which called for the marketing and disposal of
most of the state's inholdings unless the federal government agreed to
an exchange involving Lake Powell lands within a few months. This
resolution was clarified and expanded in a July 21, 1989, draft general
management plan (GMP) prepared and published by the State Land
Board. 61 Public reaction to this proposal was immediate and overwhelmingly negative, and the proposal has since been informally
rescinded. 62
One of the motivating forces behind the GMP was a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by Governor Norman Bangerter
of Utah and U.S. Secretary of the Interior Don Hodel in early 1987. 63
Shortly after Bangerter was elected Governor of Utah in 1984, Hodel,
in his first news conference as Secretary of the Interior, affirmed his
strong support for Project BOLD. 64 Governor Bangerter, however, did
60. Matheson & Becker, .\Upra note 55, at § 4.03[2]. The authors of this article point to the
appraisal process as one of the factors making exchanges so difficult. Under federal law, mineral
lands to be exchanged through the administrative process must be appraised. The appraisals must
be based on core drillings, the costs of which may exceed the value of the lands involved unless the
minerals found are extremely valuable. !d.
61. GMP, sujJra note 2.
62. The State Land Board has issued no formal statement rescinding this proposal, but the
October 1, 1989, deadline passed some time ago and the Land Hoard has taken no further action
regarding the GMP.
In November 1989, the author spoke with Scott Flandro, projects coordinator of the State
Land Board. Mr. Flandro stated that the proposal to market the inho1dings had been indefinitely
postponed.
63. SPP Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of the Interior and the
State of Utah, May 19, 1987 (on file with the BYU Journal of Public Law) [hereinafter MOU].
64. Deseret News, Feb. 21, 1985, at B1, coL 1.
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not pursue land exchange and consolidation on a statewide basis. 6 ~ On
May 19, 1987, Governor Bangerter and Secretary Hodel signed the
MOU which provided, among other things, that (1) removal of Utah
lands from federal reservations was in the best interests of both the
state and the federal agencies responsible for managing federal lands;
(2) both the state and the federal governments would cooperate in attempting to exchange the state inholdings for lands in or on the extremities of the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area; and (3) the Department of the Interior would attempt to complete the exchange
within eighteen months. 66
The idea of a Lake Powell exchange was not new. During Governor Matheson's administration, the state inquired about the feasibility
of a land exchange which would give the state lands near Lake Powell,
but such proposals were consistently rejected by the Division of Parks
and Recreation. 67 Hodel's statement of support for an exchange allowing Utah to obtain substantial landholdings near Lake Powell certainly was one factor leading to the State Land Board's decision to demand the Lake Powell Exchange in the GMP.

A.

Analysis of GMP

The first section of the GMP provides background information on
the school land grants and describes the difficulties the state has had in
attempting to encourage the federal government to cooperate with Utah
in effecting land exchanges. The GMP opens with a statement of support for the Bangerter /Hodel MOU. It then provides a brief history of
the federal school grants and Utah's grant in particular, concluding
that "the [Utah] Enabling Act and the Utah Constitution form a compact between the United States and Utah for the benefit of the state's
public school system," and that Utah's trust lands "must be managed
prudently to maximize direct economic contribution to the trust institutions, over time." 68 The plan then documents how changes in federal
policy have combined with other factors to prevent the state from realizing the benefits from its trust lands that Congress originally envisioned,69 and asserts that because of the continued state ownership pat65. Matheson & Becker, suJna note 55, at § 4-41.
66. MOU, supra note 62.
67. Matheson Testimony, supra note 51, at 30-31.
68. GMP, suprn note 2, at 7.
69. /d. at 8. As a young nation, the United States maintained a policy of disposal of public
lands. Over time, this policy was changed and revised until the passage of the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579. 90 Stat. 2743 (FLPMA), which officially
adopts a formal policy of land retention. This has affected the trust because the federal government agreed, in Utah's Enabling Act, to pay into the trust five percent of the sales of all federal
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tern of square-mile sections surrounded by seas of federal land, the
federal government essentially controls most of Utah's school trust
lands.
Next, the G MP explains how Congress reserved federal lands for
national parks, national monuments, defense areas, and so on, after
Congress had already granted sections of these lands to the state,
thereby creating the inholdings. The first section of the GMP concludes
with a complaint against the federal government for preventing the
state from realizing revenue from its inholdings by making exchange
processes so complicated as to make all but the simplest exchanges
impossible.
After voicing its support for the Lake Powell exchange, the GMP
proposes that 116,000 acres of inholdings within national parks, national monuments, national recreation areas, and Indian reservations be
sold or leased unless federal legislation providing for the Lake Powell
exchange is "imminent" by October 1, 1989. 70
Parts two and three of the GMP provide for the marketing of
mineral and surface estates respectively. These sections give general descriptions of the available lands and describe the potential for mineral
development or surface uses of the lands.

B.

Problems With the GMP

The GMP was probably either an effort to compel better cooperation from the federal government, or else merely an effort to raise public awareness of the problems Utah faces in trying to force the federal
government to cooperate with the state to eliminate the state's inholdings.71 This strategy, however, backfired; the proposal raised the ire of
many prominent citizens who blasted the land board for proposing the
sale of Utah's national parks. 72
lands. Utah Enabling Act, .1upra note I, at § I 0.
70. GMP, supra note 2, at 10-11.
71. In support of the argument that the GMP was merely an attempt to raise public awareness of the problems Utah continues to experience in trying to get rid of its inholdings, it must
have been obvious to the State Land Board that federal legislation could not possibly be "imminent" by October I, 1989, as the GMP called for, even with the full cooperation of the federal
government. That date was scarcely more than two months away from the time the GMP was
releasrd.
72. Sff, P.f'., Deseret News, Aug. 22, 1989, at Bl, col. 6 (report of public hearing in which
one man supported the GMP, one woman was ambivalent, and nearly 40 citizens "adamantly
opposed" the plan, including former Governor Scott Matheson and "teachers, lawyers, hikers, and
blue collar workers"); Salt Lake Tribune, Aug. 22, 1989, at B I, col. I (report of same meeting);
Salt Lake Tribune, Aug. 23, 1989, at AB, col. I (editorial finding it "abundantly clear" that the
GMP was "the latest in a series of maneuvers to compel better cooperation from the federal
government" and proposing that the state collect rent from the federal government for uncompen-
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If the goal of the State Land Board in releasing the GMP was to
increase public awareness of the problems involved in trying to realize
revenue from the school trust lands, then the Board achieved its goal.
However, the Board did this at the expense of its own credibility; public reaction to the proposal was overwhelmingly negative, and the
Board itself was the target of intense criticism. 73 One of the reasons for
this is that the tone of the GMP made it appear as if the Land Board
actually wanted to develop the inholdings within the national parks.
Had the Land Board given the federal government sufficient time to
respond to its demand for substantial progress on the Lake Powell exchange-for instance, twelve to eighteen months instead of two-the
Board might have appeared to be more serious and more credible.
Another unfortunate consequence of the Land Board's proposal
may have been to promote even greater reluctance on the part of federal
agencies to exchange land. For example, much of the land around Lake
Powell is a national recreation area, similar in purpose to a national
park. If the state plans to raise money through unrestricted commercial
development of the lands it hopes to acquire around Lake Powell, this
could ruin the atmosphere that the NPS desires to create through its
national recreation areas. Although some of the above writing is necessarily speculation, it is clear that the GMP did have at least one positive effect-as a result of its publication, the general public in Utah is
much more aware of the school trust lands and the state's problems in
managing those lands than the public was only a few months ago.
VI.

A.

A Surr

FOR INVERSE CoNDEMNATION?

The Argument for Inverse CondPmnation

The forementioned letter from Superintendent Moss to Attorney
General Van Dam 74 concludes with the following request:
If it be true that the land grants under the Enabling Act created trusts
binding both the State and Federal governments in a solemn compact
for the purposes stated in the grants, then the Federal government has
been guilty almost since the inception of the Trusts of a gross violation of its duties under the compact, resulting in the infliction of a
continuing and disproportionate burden of taxation upon all of the
taxpayers of Utah, and a deprivation of critically needed revenues for
Utah's schools, colleges, and institutions.
sated use of school trust lands).
73. Deseret News. sujna note 72. The report of the hearing describes "ringing cries for the
jobs of Land Board members" and "denunciations of Gov. Norm Bangerter for appointing the
Land Board members."
7 4. Sn supra section I.
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I therefore ask that you proceed without delay, as legal counsel for
the Utah Public School System, to undertake a suit against the United
States for inverse condemnation, breach of fiduciary duty, or such
other causes as you may determine, after evaluation of the facts of the
case, to be appropriate. 76

This section analyzes Superintendent Moss' request.
Initially, it should be noted that two important facts relating to
federal condemnation of state inholdings within national parks are
well-settled. First, federal policy is to eventually acquire all privately
owned inholdings within national parks, although NPS policy on this
point has vacillated from time to time. Second, the NPS possesses the
power to condemn private inholdings within national parks on behalf of
the federal government.
Over twenty-five years ago, Congress passed the Land and Water
Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 76 which provides for the planning, acquisition, and development of outdoor recreation areas. Since its passage, the act has been the main source of funds with which the federal
government has acquired its national parks and other recreation
lands. 77
Congress has often asserted that it intends to acquire all private
inholdings within the national parks. 78 Federal courts have recognized
Congress' apparent intent to acquire these lands. 79 The NPS, by con75. Letter from James R. Moss, Utah State Superintendent of Public Instruction, to Paul
Van Dam, Utah State Attorney General (October 25, 1989) (letter on file with the BYU Journal
of Public Law).
76. Pub. L. No. 88-578. 78 Stat. 897 (codified as amended at 16 US.C. § 460d, 460/-4 to
460/-11, 23 US.C. § 120 (1988)).
77. SPP S. REP. No. 162, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977); H. REP. No. 156, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1977). The Act provides, in part, that "[m]oney appropriated from the fund for Federal
purposes shall . . be allotted by the President . . [f]or the acquisition of land, waters, or interests in land or waters . . [w]ithin the exterior boundaries of the National Park System." 16
U.S.C.A. § 460/-9 (West Supp. 1989).
78. Sn S. REP. No. 162, sujml note 77. The Report discusses H.R. 5306, the purpose of
which was to provide funding "to acquire the backlog of lands previously authorized for inclusion
in the national park system." /d. at 2. Lands previously authorized included all areas within
national parks. Sn 16 U.S.C. § 460/-9. The report includes the following statement: "The committee clearly recognizes that the intent of Congress is to eventually acquire all in holdings located
in the national park system." S. REP. No. 162, supra, note 77, at 6.
SPP also H. REP. No. 156, supra note 77 (recognizing need to acquire inholdings and proposing amendments to H.R. 5306 which would state Congress' express intent to acquire all inholdings within three years of enactment of amendment); 123 CoNG. Rn:. 16,690 (Congress has,
for some time, intended to acquire all private inholdings within national parks) (remarks of Rep.
Sebelius).
In 1987, Congress extended the funding of the Act through 2015. This indicates a continuing
desire on the part of Congress to eventually acquire all private lands within the national parks.
SPP 16 U.S.C.A. § 4601-5(c)(2) and 1987 Amendment (West Supp. 1989).
79. Sn Committee of 100 on the Federal City v. Hodel, 611 F. Supp. 547, 559, 560 (D.D.C.
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trast, has at different times maintained policies of either prompt or
eventual acquisition of private inholdings within national parks. Currently, the NPS does not have a strict policy of acquisition per se;
rather, park superintendents are required to complete Land Protection
Plans (LPPs) specifying which park lands need to be taken out of private ownership and whether any park lands may be protected by means
other than federal acquisition in fee. 80 Regardless of the NPS's current
policy, however, Congress clearly seems to favor eventual federal acquisition in fee ownership of all inholdings within the national parks. This
policy reflects the ethical consideration that since the federal government effectively controls all uses on national park lands, it should acquire clear title to all park lands, and by so doing compensate prior
owners of the lands.
Congress has given government officials, including the NPS, liberal power to condem property through the Condemnation Act. 81 The
United States Supreme Court has found this condemnation authority to
be extremely broad. 82
Unfortunately, the fact that Congress apparently wants the NPS
to eventually acquire all privately-owned lands within national parks,
combined with the fact that Congress has given the NPS authority to
condemn private lands within national parks, has not motivated the
NPS to actually condemn Utah's inholdings. This can probably be attributed to the fact that although the Land and Water Conservation
Fund Act of 1965 is currently funded for at least $900,000,000 per

1985) ("Congress has repeatedly reaffirmed its intention that the amendments to the land and
Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 be used to further the goal of acquiring all private inholdings within national parks."); United States v. 0.37 Acres of Land, 414 F. Supp. 470, 472 (D.
Mont. 1976) ("It seems quite clear that Congress has long favored the acquisition of private lands
within the boundaries of the national parks. This is reflected not only by the continued appropriations for acquisition of such inholdings, but likewise by legislative history of the laws relating to
them.") (citations omitted).

80. For a discussion of the various policies pursued by the NPS, see generally Comment,
Park.1, Proj1lr, and Pri1•nlr Proprrly: Thr National Park Srn•irr and Eminrnl Domain, 16
ENVTL. L. 935, 939-40 (Summer 1986).
81. The Condemnation Act provides, in relevant part:
In every case in which . . [any] officer of the Government has been, or hereafter shall
be, authorized to procure real estate for the erection of a public uses, he may acquire
the same for the United States by condemnation, under judicial process, whenever in
his opinion it is necessary or advantageous to the Government to do so .
40 l_rS.C. § 257 (1982).
82. In United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 236 (1946), the Supreme Court held that it
"must be slow to read into [the Condemnation Act] unexpressed limitations restricting the authority of the very officials named in [the Act] as the ones upon whom Congress chose to rely."
For further discussion of the NPS's authority to condemn land, see Comment, sujna note 80,
at 936-38.
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year through the year 2015, 88 money from the fund may only be spent
if appropriated by Congress. 84 In this time of rising federal budget deficits and increasing federal commitments, it should come as little surprise that appropriations have diminished steadily in recent years. 85
Even if the federal government had an unlimited supply of money,
however, the NPS would have little incentive to go through the bureaucratic headaches necessary to condemn private inholdings within national parks, since it effectively controls all private land within national
parks already. The current federal budget deficit, combined with this
natural reluctance on the part of the NPS to condemn private inholdings, renders the likelihood of condemnation of Utah's inholdings extremely remote at any time in the foreseeable future. Therefore, if Utah
desires to enjoy the benefits of condemnation of its inholdings, 86 it will
have to bring a suit of inverse condemnation against the NPS.

B.

Inverse Condemnation Procedure and Requirements

The law of inverse condemnation is governed by the Tucker Act. 87
Stated generally, inverse condemnation is a remedy sought when a government agency has taken private property (either personal or real) for
a public use without compensating the owner. 88 In such a case, a property owner may sue the government agency involved for just compensation. 59 Federal courts have held that inverse condemnation may occur
where government regulation is "practically so burdensome and pervasive that the landowner is denied all use of his land," 90 and where
government acts impede and interfere with an owner's use of property
in such a manner as to constitute a taking of the fee interest therein. 91
83. 16 U.S.C.A. § 460/-5(c)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 460/-6 (1988).
85. E.g., Comment, supra note 80, at 941 n.35.
86. The author does not imply that condemnation of the inholdings is the best solution to the
problems created by the in holdings. Obviously, one advantage of condemnation is that the federal
government would be forced to pay Utah fair market value for over 116,000 acres of land, resulting in a large infusion of capital into the principal of the School Trust Fund.
As this comment shows, Utah has for some time attempted to exchange its inholdings for
comparable lands outside its national parks without success. A land exchange would probably
provide the state with greater protection against inflation than an outright sale of the inholdings
and other trust lands. However, land exchanges involving inholdings within national parks would
be more difficult to effect than traditional land exchanges, primarily because FLPMA requires the
federal government to exchange lands on a value-for-value basis, and it is difficult to ascertain the
values of national park lands.
87. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (1982).
88. 7 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER'S EDITION § 14:155 ( 1982).
89. /d. at 14:156.
90. Armijo v. United States, 663 F.2d 90, 93 (Ct. Cl. 1981 ).
91. Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
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The action may be brought in either a U.S. District Court or the U.S.
Claims Court, but must be brought in the U.S. Claims Court if the
amount claimed is over $10,000. 92 For an inverse condemnation suit to
lie, the taking must be authorized by Congress. 93 Any civil action
brought against the United States must be brought within six years
from the time the right of action first accrues or it will be barred. 94
If Utah were to initiate an inverse condemnation proceeding concerning its inholdings, most of these elements would be easily satisfied.
Obviously, a taking authorized by Congress has occurred. Over 116,000
acres of real property, which were granted to the state by the federal
government for the express purpose of providing support for public education, were subsequently trapped within national parks through
Congressional action. The congressionally mandated purpose of the
parks, which is to preserve and protect the parks and leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations, directly conflicts
with the congressionally mandated purpose of the school trust lands,
which is to provide revenue for the schools. Because the state's inholdings are small parcels of land trapped within large national parks, the
inholdings are managed as national park lands. It may well be said that
the government regulation of the inholdings is "practically so burdensome and pervasive that the landowner is denied all use of his land." 911
There is, however, one major difficulty with Utah's bringing an
action charging the federal government with inverse condemnation, and
that is the six-year statute of limitations. 96 If a court were to hold that
the inholdings were "taken" by the NPS on the date that the respective
national parks were created, then the six-year statute of limitations obviously would have long since run. On the other hand, if a court were
to hold that the takings occurred on the date that the final Land Protection Plans for the respective national parks became effective, then the
takings may have occurred within the last six years.
To summarize, the NPS has the authority to condemn private inholdings within Utah's national parks. Although Congress favors federal acquisition of inholdings within the national parks, the funds provided for by the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 are
not bfing appropriated by Congress in the amounts envisioned by the
Act itself. This fact, combined with natural reluctance on the part of
the NPS to undertake action to condemn lands that it already effec-

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

7

FEDERAL PROCEDURE,

supra note 88, at 14:156.

Irl.
28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1982).

SPP Ar111ijo, 663 F.2d at 93.
Srf .IU/Jrn

note 94 and accompanymg text.
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tively controls, makes it unlikely that the NPS will condemn Utah's
inholdings at any time in the near future. The state may elect to initiate an action charging the NPS with inverse condemnation of the inholdings, but the success of such an action may depend upon when the
actual taking took place. The statute of limitations imposed by the
Tucker Act may have already run.

VII.

CoNCLUSION

The school trust lands granted to Utah by the federal government
were intended to serve as a source of revenue for Utah's public schools.
For a variety of reasons, however, the trust lands have never provided
these schools with significant revenues. The state has a fiduciary duty
to manage the trust lands in a manner that will provide Utah's schools
with the benefits that Congress intended they should receive.
Although sale of the trust lands is one option, it is not an appealing one. Utah's trust lands, if sold in their current scattered state,
would probably not command a worthwhile price. Unloading millions
of acres of trust lands on the marketplace would drive the price of the
trust lands down even further. It is therefore highly unlikely that the
state will ever realize a substantial economic benefit from its trust lands
unless the state is somehow able to convince the federal government to
work with the state in conducting a massive land exchange, allowing
the state to consolidate its holdings and manage them effectively. The
burden with this does not lie solely with the federal government. The
state of Utah needs to develop a viable proposal for a comprehensive
iand exchange. The Bangerter administration has concerned itself with
solving the inholdings problem while neglecting the overall problems
with the trust lands.
In the meantime, the state should not rule out possible legal action
against the federal government. Obviously, the state has not been
treated fairly with regard to its trust lands. A suit alleging inverse condemnation of at least the inholdings would at least encourage the federal government to deal fairly with the state. If the state does nothing,
however, it will continue to realize virtually no benefit from its trust
lands.

Matthew J. Harmer

